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Institutions influence the design, use and adoption of information technologies. The IS 
field has a long tradition in institutional analyses, especially concerning how ICT gains 
legitimacy in organizational settings. However, few analyses have been conducted on 
how legal reforms influence regulative ICT legitimacy. We studied the effect of policy am-
biguity on regulative legitimacy through a revelatory case study of a legal reform con-
cerning the taximeter regulation in Finland. The regulation changed from being specific 
and providing legal certainty to being ambiguous and resulting in legal indeterminacy. 
We contribute to the IS institutions and legitimacy research stream by arguing that the 
transition from specific to ambiguous regulation shifted the locus of regulative legitimacy 
from an inherent property of legal formulation to a processual form, and provide a 
framework to support studies on regulative change by distinguishing between type of 
policy and legal state of the technology. Our study has methodological implications.  
Keywords: Regulative legitimacy, policy ambiguity, legal reforms, regulation, technology-in-use 
 
Introduction 
Institutions are central to Information Systems (IS) research (Mignerat and Rivard 2009) as they influence 
all IS phenomena: “the design, use, and consequences of technologies, either within or across organiza-
tions” (Orlikowski and Barley 2001, p. 153). In institutional analysis, a core concern is how things gain their 
legitimacy (Suddaby et al. 2017), defined as a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs 
and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574). IS researchers have spent decades investigating how technologies 
gain legitimacy in organizational settings (Gosain 2004; Hsu et al. 2012; King et al. 1994; Levy and Bui 
2019) and studied how ICT legitimacy affects the adoption and use of IS (Kaganer et al. 2010; Krell et al. 
2016; Winter et al. 2009). Regardless, in the IS field, the influence of laws on ICT legitimacy has received 
scant attention, and institutional analyses have mostly been performed within organizational boundaries 
(Winter et al. 2014). While legal reforms have tremendous potential influence on IS phenomena through 
regulative legitimacy, there is not much research on this (Avgerou and McGrath 2007). 
The premise of this paper is as follows. Government authorities possess the strength of legal authority and 
“set the context within which all other institutions may and shall operate” (King et al. 1994, p. 148). Insti-
tutional theorists call this the regulatory pillar of institutions (Scott 1995). When legislation or regulation 
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set by government authorities is specific and restrictive, and is driven by goals of certainty and predictabil-
ity, legitimacy is a property of the legislation. In the parlance of jurisprudence, this is often referred to as 
the Rule of Law (Gosalbo-Bono 2010) or the principle of legality (Besselink et al. 2011). Written law must 
be clear, and people must live according to it or they will face sanctions. Courts must justify their decisions 
on the law and law only (Scalia 1989). 
When legislation regulates the adoption and use of technology, the question is which old and new technol-
ogies it legitimates or not. When the law changes, how does it influence the (further) use of old and adoption 
of new technology? When studying legitimacy, three different approaches can be distinguished that differ 
greatly in their basic assumptions about what legitimacy is seen to be, where it occurs and how it occurs: 
legitimacy as property, legitimacy as process, and legitimacy as perception (Suddaby et al. 2017). In addi-
tion, several forms of legitimacy exist that lean on different institutional bases, and regulative legitimacy 
becomes especially important in the light of legal reforms. Regulative legitimacy is produced when organi-
zations set up new practices in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations. From this follows that 
regulative legitimation for information technology can be achieved, for example, by emphasizing that the 
technology conforms to the effective laws that regulate the technology (Kaganer et al. 2010).  
However, when a legal reform is driven by the free market ethos, that the invisible hand of the market rather 
than the government should be the ultimate judge (Määttä 2001), the written legislation becomes more 
ambiguous when it avoids making decisions for the market. A practical challenge appears. It is an intellec-
tually curious question: How can regulative legitimacy be reached if the law is not specific about which 
technology is legitimate and which is not? IT policy affects the adoption and use of technology (Bernardi et 
al. 2017; Eaton et al. 2018). Thus, at the same time when investigating policy ambiguity in ICT policy, the 
researchers need to pay attention to the technologies the policy affects – and how it affects them. How does 
regulative legitimacy emerge in the relational space between ambiguous legislation and technologies? Given 
the fact that IT policy and technology legitimacy affect technology adoption and use, and the simultaneous 
lack of research on the influence of laws on regulative legitimacy of ICT, we ask the question:  
“How does the change from specific to ambiguous policy affect regulative legitimacy of technology?” 
To answer this question, we conducted an empirical case study in Finland, before and after the implemen-
tation of the deregulatory reform known as the Act on Transport Services of July 2018 (see also Lanamäki 
et al. (forthcoming)). As a part of this reform, the previous specific, unambiguous regulation regarding the 
use of taximeters in taxi cars was revised to an “enabling regulation”1 to allow also other technologies such 
as smartphone apps to be used. However, the change of the Finnish taximeter law from specific to ambigu-
ous led to a confused legislative state where it was no longer possible to determine for all technologies 
whether they are legal or illegal in the light of the currently effective law. This implies legal indeterminacy, 
i.e., that every legal question does not have a single right answer (Maxeiner 2006b). In our context, this 
refers to conditions where it is not possible to determine the legal status of various technologies used for 
similar purposes. In our study, we identified two types of ambiguity in the present taximeter law and ana-
lyzed how the identified policy ambiguity affects the regulative legitimacy of different types of technologies 
presently used by different actors on the market for calculating and/or giving the consumers information 
on the price of the ride. We refer to these technologies as “technologies-in-use” (Suchman et al. 1999).  
We contribute to the IS institutions and legitimacy research stream in two ways. First, we show how the 
transition from specific to enabling regulation shifts the locus of institutional – and more specifically regu-
lative – legitimacy from an inherent property of legal formulation to a more relational, performative and 
contested form. We put forward the proposition that when a technology law is ambiguous, legitimacy of 
technology takes the form of legitimation as a process (see Suddaby et al. 2017). Consequently, we advocate 
the methodological approach that settings where ambiguous policy regulates technology require simulta-
neous focus on the legal formulation of an ambiguous policy (i.e., the institutional context) vis-à-vis the 
technologies that are developed or adopted into use on the market. It is necessary to study how a policy is 
ambiguous in its formulation and its interpretations made by its stakeholders. Second, we propose policy 
 
1 “Enabling regulation” was a concept regularly used by Finland’s Sipilä Government (2015-2019), which 
aimed “to create enabling regulation, promote deregulation and reduce the administrative burden.” (Gov-
ernment Action Plan 2017-2019, p. 64, available at https://valtioneuvosto.fi/docu-
ments/10184/321857/Government+action+plan+28092017+en.pdf). 
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type and legal state of the technology as key dimensions when studying the regulative legitimacy of tech-
nology in the context of ICT policy reforms.   
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the theoretical foundation to ambiguity and regulative 
legitimacy and the key concepts we use in this study. We then describe our methodological approach, fol-
lowed by a description of our findings where we present two types of ambiguity that we identified in the 
taximeter law, as well as seven types of technologies-in-use and their situation regarding regulative legiti-
macy. Finally, we present and discuss the contributions of our study and conclude the paper with practical 
implications, research limitations and suggestions for future research.  
Theoretical Background 
In this section, we first describe the theoretical foundation to ambiguity and more specifically means am-
biguity in the context of policy making. We summarize how IS research has addressed policy ambiguity-
related questions to date, concluding this is in an unexplored territory to IS research. Then, we develop the 
conceptual basis for our paper. We introduce the concepts of legitimacy from an institutional, regulative 
perspective and describe the relationship between regulative legitimacy, legal indeterminacy, and ambigu-
ity. Finally, we summarize the key concepts that we use in the analysis of our empirical case study.  
Policy Ambiguity 
Ambiguity is “the state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstance or phenomena.” 
(Feldman 1989, p. 5). Cohen and March (1974) distinguished between three types of ambiguity: goal ambi-
guity, authority ambiguity, and means ambiguity. These categories have had profound influence for IS and 
organizational research on ambiguity (Denis et al. 1996; Jarzabkowski et al. 2010; Ravishankar 2013). Goal 
ambiguity refers to unclear objectives, whereas means ambiguity implies uncertainty and an unclear rela-
tionship between goals and the means to achieving the goal(s). In the context of policy, ambiguity of means 
can arise, e.g., when a law-mandated technology does not yet exist, or when it is unclear which organizations 
should play which roles in the process of implementing a policy. Furthermore, means ambiguity prevails 
when the choice or outcome of technology is unclear (Matland 1995). Authority ambiguity refers to “ambi-
guity created by the presence of multiple authority and power centers” (Ravishankar 2013, p. 317).  
Ambiguity can be used strategically as a discursive resource (Jarzabkowski et al. 2010; Ravishankar 2013). 
In IS research, Ravishankar (2013) studied strategic ambiguity and shows that it is a “core aspect of public 
ICT innovations” (p. 327). He illustrates how a team utilized strategic ambiguity during the implementation 
of a project when establishing the project’s scope, in the relationship with another organization, and in 
public communications. Best (2012) identified how IMF and the World Bank take strategic use of ambiguity 
as a coping mechanism to prepare for unforeseen events. However, even though (strategic) ambiguity may 
be used as an intentional and beneficial asset, it is more commonly seen as a problem. Matland (1995) 
synthesized policy implementation literature from an ambiguity perspective and identified four policy im-
plementation processes that differ in their degree of ambiguity and degree of conflict. The rising of conflict 
requires that actors are interdependent, and that objectives are incompatible with each other. When organ-
izations who see a policy to be directly relevant in the light of the organizations’ interests have differing 
views, policy conflict exists. Matland (1995) distinguishes for each process situations where policy ambigu-
ity is present regarding the goals or the means of policy implementation. Identifying ambiguous statements 
in information security policy, Buthelezi et al. (2016) argue that non-compliance with information security 
might be due to policy ambiguity. Stahl et al. (2012) conducted a critical discourse analysis on information 
security policies used in the UK’s National Health Service. They found that there is considerable ambiguity 
in these policy documents regarding the policies’ objectives and intended targets (i.e., who is supposed to 
implement the policy). Ambiguities caused by jargon and technical (and thus unfamiliar) language were 
identified as reasons why information security policy is not being implemented as intended. Lanamäki et 
al. (2019) demonstrate how the ambiguous Finnish taximeter regulation led to a number of contesting dis-
courses about what a taximeter is for. Though being an established field in strategy research, in the infor-
mation systems field, research addressing policy ambiguity is scarce.  
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The Concepts of Legitimacy, Legal Certainty and Legal Indeterminacy  
Ever since the publication of Max Weber’s Economy and Society (1968), social scientists have been con-
cerned with the notion of legitimacy. One of the most recent reviews on this construct is the one provided 
by Suddaby and colleagues (2017), who conducted an extensive review of existing legitimacy literature in 
eight highly ranked management journals. They identified three streams of legitimacy research that differ 
in their assumptions regarding what legitimacy is seen to be in each stream, where legitimacy occurs, and 
how it occurs. In the property stream, legitimacy is seen as a property/asset/thing that occurs between the 
legitimacy object and its external environment. In this view, legitimacy occurs mostly at the organizational 
and field levels when the legitimacy object fulfils the expectations of an external audience. In the process 
stream, legitimacy is seen as “an interactive process of social construction” (Suddaby et al. 2017, p. 453) 
that occurs between several different social actors, and specifically between those that either oppose change 
or support it. In this view, legitimacy occurs foremost at the field level (e.g., an industry) through the tar-
geted efforts of different social actors. In the perception view, legitimacy is an evaluation or social judge-
ment that occurs between individual and collective evaluators. In this view, legitimacy occurs through the 
actions, perceptions and judgements of individuals that are influenced by institutionalized judgements on 
a collective level, and it occurs mostly at the microlevel.  
In the present research, we take an institutional approach to legitimacy (as opposed to the strategic ap-
proach), which sees legitimacy as a condition which reflects how well something is perceived to adhere to, 
for instance, certain rules or laws (Johnson et al. 2006; Kaganer et al. 2010; Scott 1995). Legitimacy can 
come from three sources, also referred to as “pillars of institution”: the regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive pillar (Scott 1995). In the present research, we specifically address regulative legitimacy. Reg-
ulation by institutions such as government authorities refers to the intervention (either direct or indirect) 
in the behaviour exhibited by all those who are under the influence of that institution (King et al. 2014). 
Regulative legitimacy flows from such institutions when they define what is acceptable legally or procedure-
wise with help of sanctions and requirements (Johnson et al. 2006) targeted to modify the behaviour of 
those who are influenced by the institution (King et al. 2014). Flickinger (2009: 14), referring to North 
(1990), defines that regulative legitimacy “originates from the adherence to laws, rules, and standards”, and 
for new information technologies it can be achieved, for example, by emphasizing that the technology con-
forms to the effective laws that regulate the technology (Kaganer et al. 2010). 
However, what happens when the law does not provide a ground for clearly presenting ones’ technology as 
conforming to the effective law, such as can be the case when means ambiguity exists in a policy? Legal 
indeterminacy is a situation where “legal questions lack single right answers” (Kress 1989, p. 283). Its 
consequences for legitimacy are “prima facie the main reason why legal scholars do and should care about 
indeterminacy” (Kress 1989, p. 285). In this article, we apply the concept to situations where it is not pos-
sible to determine the legal status of various technologies that share the same purpose. In legal scholarship, 
the old tradition of legal formalism was based on a belief that legal conclusions should be drawn mechanis-
tically and rationally from its premises (Dworkin 1977). Legal scholarship and practice in postwar America 
shifted from formalism to legal realism, which is a naturalistic approach to law. It transformed the role of 
courts from a logical to an empirical exercise (Leiter 2010). Through the mainstreaming of legal realism in 
the United States, the conception of legal indeterminacy became more popular and accepted (Dagan 2007). 
Maxeiner (2006b) argues that legal indeterminacy is largely an American phenomenon.  
In Europe and particularly in Germany, the legal framework is built on the principle of legal certainty 
(Maxeiner 2006a). Under the European Law, the legal certainty principle requires that (Maxeiner 2006a, 
p. 519): (1) laws and decisions must be made public; (2) laws and decisions must be definite and clear; (3) 
decisions of courts must be binding; (4) limitations on retroactivity of laws and decisions must be imposed; 
and (5) legitimate expectations must be protected. 
There are various ways to think about the implications of ambiguity in the context of regulative legitimacy 
and the indeterminacy it brings. For example, Hansen (2016) argues that ambiguity of legal text is the rea-
son why global arms trade persists despite obligations in international law. McGoey and Jackson (2009) 
reported how legal ambiguity created a loophole for a drug company to withhold information about effects 
and risks. Ruohonen and Kimppa (2019) similarly identified that the failure to regulate against the sales of 
intrusion software and other offensive cyber security technologies originates in the difficulty to provide an 
unambiguous definition for ‘cyber weapons’ in the international Wassenaar Arrangement. Indeterminacy 
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is also seen as the source for legal loopholes facilitating corporate tax avoidance (Picciotto 2015). Maxeiner 
(2006b) argues that legal indeterminacy effectively erodes public trust in law. 
In this paper, our purpose is to investigate how, in our Finnish context, the earlier enforced legal certainty 
of taximeter regulation turned into legally an indeterminate regime of various technologies-in-use. We 
study how a legal reform that introduces an enabling but ambiguous form of technology regulation the af-
fects regulative legitimacy of the technology, i.e., how technologies gain their regulative legitimacy under 
ambiguous policy. Table 1 summarizes the key concepts we use.  
 
Concept Explanation 
Regulative legitimacy Regulative legitimacy defines what is acceptable legally or procedure-wise with 
help of sanctions and requirements (Johnson et al. 2006) targeted to modify 
the behaviour of those who are influenced by the institution (King et al. 2014). 
Regulative legitimation for new information technologies can be achieved, for 
example, by emphasizing that the technology conforms to the effective laws 
that regulate the technology (Kaganer et al. 2010). 
Legal indeterminacy The consequence of ambiguous jurisdiction for courts: “legal questions lack 
single right answers” (Kress 1989, p. 283) 
Legal certainty The consequence of unambiguous jurisdiction for citizens, enabling law-abid-
ance: “people can know what the law is and can orient their conduct on what it 
requires” (Maxeiner 2006b, p. 525). 
Ambiguity  
 
Ambiguity is “the state of having many ways of thinking about the same cir-
cumstance or phenomena.” (Feldman, 1989, p. 5).  
Table 1. Key Concepts Used in this Study 
 
Research Methodology 
To answer our research question “How does the change from specific to ambiguous policy affect regulative 
legitimacy of technology?”, we conducted a qualitative interpretive case study (Walsham 1995) in the Finn-
ish taxi industry. This case was especially revelatory, as the policy reform turned a specific taximeter regu-
lation into an ambiguous one. Numerous different types of technologies-in-use appeared after on the Finn-
ish taxi market. Thus, it is a highly suitable case to study how regulative legitimacy of technology was af-
fected by this change from specific to ambiguous policy. As we outlined in the Introduction, studying how 
policy ambiguity affects technologies-in-use requires simultaneous attention to both. Our research design 
is built on this logic. We collected and analyzed data regarding both the ambiguity of the regulation (mostly 
through interviews), and the different technologies-in-use (through interviews and desk research) to allow 
us an analysis of how regulative legitimacy unfolds in such a setting.  
Data Collection 
Our main source of data was interviews that we conducted with key stakeholders of the Finnish taxi industry 
and public authorities. We also collected information on the different technologies-in-use from online 
sources. Between January 2018 and February 2020, we conducted 3 rounds of interviews (round 1 before 
the new law that de-regulated the industry became effective, rounds 2 and 3 after the law became effective). 
Overall, we conducted 79 interviews with a broad range of key stakeholders involved in or affected by the 
de-regulation of the industry2, including both organizations (64 interviews, interview length: 21-218 min) 
and taxi drivers (15 interviews, interview length: 10-36 min). We had started out with a few core organiza-
tions involved in and/or affected by the legal change, and then applied snowballing technique to identify 
further focus organizations. Through this, we covered a very wide range of different stakeholders. The or-
ganizations interviewed included: seven Finnish dispatch organizations, two taximeter producers, the Finn-
ish Taxi Owner-Drivers’ Federation (FTOF), two international ride-sharing platform providers Uber and 
Bolt (former Taxify), the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MTC), the Finnish Transport Safety 
 
2 Abbreviations of organizations are our own abbreviations for the sake of saving space. They are not offi-
cially used by the authorities themselves. 
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Agency (FTSA), the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (FSCA), the Finnish Taxation Office (FTO), the 
Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA), app developers, and taxi drivers. We interviewed 
most organizations two or three times over the 2-year timespan. In the interviews, we asked about the dig-
italization of the Finnish taxi industry, the effects of the de-regulation of the industry, the taximeter regu-
lation, and the effect all of those had on the organization. In addition, we interviewed several taxi drivers. 
Based on the information we gained from the interviews, we collected additional information online about 
different technologies-in-use for ride-hailing and for calculating and/or announcing the price of the ride to 
the consumer (i.e., about potential “other devices”). We triangulated the information from interviews with: 
documents received from the organizations or found online (e.g., presentation slides); official press re-
leases; organization websites; law proposals made by the MTC; newspaper articles concerning the taximeter 
and its regulation; and newspaper articles concerning the interviewed stakeholder organizations. 
Data Analysis and Validation of Findings 
Our data analysis was a continuous and long process. During the first round of interviews in spring 2018, 
we noticed that the new taximeter regulation that would become effective in July 2018 was not interpreted 
the same way by different stakeholders regarding the possibilities to use devices or systems other than a 
certified taximeter. This was where we first realized that the new regulation might be ambiguous. Conse-
quently, in the second (autumn 2018) and third round (autumn 2019) of interviews we more specifically 
addressed the taximeter regulation and interpretations of the regulation to find out why different interpre-
tations existed. Then, between November 2019 and January 2020, we conducted the data analysis for this 
present article specifically. In the first step of the data analysis, we read through the interview transcripts, 
47 of which were specifically relevant from the perspective of the taximeter regulation. We used NVivo (ver-
sion 12) and extracted all text passages in the interview transcripts that referred in some way to the certified 
taximeter or other technologies used as taximeter. In the second step of the analysis, we analyzed how dif-
ferent stakeholders interpreted the new taximeter law, and through these different interpretations we were 
able to identify two types of ambiguity that the law gave rise to: (1) When is the price based on the 
measurement of time and/or distance (see Findings sub-section regarding Ambiguity 1), and (2) What is an 
“other device or system” (see Findings sub-section regarding Ambiguity 2). We e also took note that the old 
taximeter law did not allow for different interpretations. In the third step of the analysis, we identified tech-
nologies that give some price information for a ride to the consumer, either before or after the ride, and 
which were in use on the Finnish taxi market under the new taximeter regulation. We classified these tech-
nologies-in-use into seven types of technologies. We see these technologies as actual, concrete interpreta-
tions of the ambiguous law. By bringing them to the market and using them, actors express that they deem 
these technologies to be legal, or at least they “dare” to use them in the light of the prevailing policy ambi-
guity and do not see them as outright illegal. In the final step, we analyzed the regulative legitimacy of 
these different technology types, i.e., whether and how they conform to or are problematic in the light of 
the new, ambiguous taximeter law. We deducted four “yes or no” questions from the interpretations of the 
ambiguous taximeter law (see Table 2), and then analyzed whether legal certainty or legal indeterminacy 
existed for each of the seven technologies-in-use depending on what the answer to one or more of these four 
questions would be. We found that the ambiguous law lead to a state of legal indeterminacy for some 
technologies (see Findings sub-section “Legal certainty and legal indeterminacy of technologies-in-use”).  
Validation of findings. We wanted to validate our findings regarding our interpretations of whether and 
how/why different technological solutions that are currently used to give some price information to the 
consumer, and thus might be seen as “taximeter or other device”, can be problematic in the light of the 
taximeter law. Therefore, we wrote a report about the ambiguity in the taximeter law (Väyrynen and 
Lanamäki 2020). In this report, we presented our analysis regarding the different types of technologies and 
what kind of problems we identified for them in the light of the ambiguous law. We sent the report of our 
analysis to 22 of the organizations (45 interviewees) we had interviewed and asked them whether they felt 
the report accurately reflected the current situation regarding the taximeter law and resulting ambiguity, 
whether they found any flaws in our analysis, whether they could think of any additional technologies-in-
use that we might have missed, and whether they have any other comments. 18 persons from 13 organiza-
tions (including the FTOF, MTC, FSCA, FTO, FCCA, two taximeter providers, and several dispatch organi-
zations) got back to us (either by email, or in person), some pointing out terminological issues, or clarifica-
tions regarding, e.g., the functionality of the certified taximeter. One interviewee pointed out that there 
potentially could exist one more category of certified taximeters (i.e., taximeters whose certification has 
 Policy Ambiguity and Regulative Legitimacy of Technology 
  
Forty-First International Conference on Information Systems, India 2020 
 7 
 
expired), but after discussing this question with the FSCA who is responsible for taximeters as measurement 
devices, we concluded that those expired taximeters still qualify as certified taximeters and thus do not 
represent a separate technology category. Most importantly, none of those interviewees and organizations 
who replied disagreed with our analysis or pointed out any flaws. The only change to the technology classi-
fications between our report and this research paper is that in the present study we distinguish seven types 
of technologies-in-use (compared to six in the report). Due to our focus on regulative legitimacy, we here 
lifted Technology 7 as a separate category. In our report, it had been presented as one form of Technology 
5, but because Technology 7 clearly is legal whereas Technology 5 could also be argued to be problematic in 
the light of the law ambiguity, for clarity purposes we present them here as separate technology categories.  
Findings 
First, we describe the previous unambiguous and present ambiguous taximeter law. Then, we describe the 
two types of ambiguity we identified in the new taximeter law based on our analysis of interviews and sup-
porting data. Finally, we provide our analysis of the legal state of the technologies-in-use. 
Taximeter Regulation 
Legal certainty under the previous specific and unambiguous taximeter regulation  
Until June 2018, the Finnish taximeter regulation stated that all taxi cars had to use a certified taximeter, 
and no other cars could use a certified taximeter. The certified taximeter is one that corresponds to the EU 
measurement directive3, fulfills the technical requirements set by that directive, and has been approved by 
a notified body. The directive sets clear requirements for certified taximeters. The maximum permissible 
errors for measurement of the time elapsed is ± 0,1 % and for the distance travelled ± 0,2 %. The directive 
requires a certified taximeter to possess electromagnetic immunity and sets certain data protection require-
ments (e.g., it has to have an indestructible memory). In addition, a certified taximeter has to be fixed-
installed in the car to qualify as certified taximeter. As certified taximeters have to undergo a strict testing 
process by this “notified body”, i.e. an independent agency, t0 confirm whether or not the tested and eval-
uated technology fulfill the requirements set for a certified taximeter, there was no lack of clarity about 
whether a certain taximeter technology was legal to use as taximeter. If it was a certified taximeter it was 
legal, otherwise it was illegal. The specific, unambiguous regulation, which was valid until June 30th 2018, 
had an inherent regulative legitimacy that clearly determined the certified taximeter to be the only legiti-
mate technology-in-use, and thus legal certainty existed for the technology-in-use.  
The new and ambiguous taximeter regulation  
The Sipilä Cabinet of Finland took office in May 2015 and introduced “Digitalization, Experimentation and 
Deregulation” as a focus area in its government program.4 Within the transportation sector, the Finnish 
taxi industry was specifically targeted for the deregulation. In international comparison, the industry was 
relatively strictly regulated. Within this deregulatory reform, the Act on Transport Services, also the taxi-
meter law was to be changed. In April 2017, the parliament accepted the opening of the taxi industry for 
competition, and with it, a new taximeter law to become effective on July 1st, 2018. The new law read:  
“If the price of the journey is based on measuring the distance or time, a vehicle used for transport requir-
ing a licence shall have a taximeter5, or some other device or system with which a similar level of meas-
urement accuracy and standard of data protection can be achieved shall be used to determine the price.”6  
With this reformulated taximeter law, the legislators wanted to spur new innovations by allowing the use 
of technologies other than the certified taximeter for defining the price of a taxi ride. More specifically, 
 
3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0032&from=EN 
4 https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/sipila/government-programme (Accessed 21 April 2020) 
5 In the law formulation, the term “taximeter” refers to a certified taximeter. 
6 This English translation was used by the Finnish Ministry of Transportation and Communications in an inquiry to the 
EU Commission in April 2020 (see p. 2): https://api.hankeikkuna.fi/asiakirjat/c4077dd3-865e-4b76-af24-
5f945361ef18/9347bd74-c83d-476d-913e-dfb66259bea8/KIRJE_20200611064812.PDF (Accessed 12 August 2020) 
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many of the interviewees suspected that the law was specifically targeted at providing regulative legitimacy 
for Uber’s operations in Finland without the need to use a certified taximeter. A representative of a taxi 
dispatch company commented: “Now the ministry has to correct the formulation of the law. They at-
tempted to legitimate Uber (on the market), that no certified taximeter would be needed. But the formu-
lation of the law went awry.” However, as it turned out, the way the law was formulated was ambiguous, 
giving rise to several different interpretations as to what technology would be legal or not. The new law 
caused a situation of legal indeterminacy for some technologies-in-use, as we will describe below. 
Ambiguity 1 – When is the Price Based on Measurement of Time and Distance?  
The first ambiguity arising from the new, ambiguous taximeter policy formulation concerned the question 
of when the price is based on measurement of time and distance. All interviewees agree that according to 
the new law, no taximeter or other device is needed if the ride is a fixed-priced ride, where a binding price 
is agreed on before the ride, because the price of the ride then clearly is not dependent on the measurement 
of the actual amount of time or distance driven. The price will not change for reasons that are out of the 
control of the passenger, e.g., if the passenger changes the destination of the ride or wants to make addi-
tional stops, then these changes are in the control of the customer and thus can affect the price. However, 
the first ambiguity concerns the question when the price of a taxi ride is based on the measurement of time 
and distance, or in other words, when a certified taximeter or “other device” is required. This first ambiguity 
arises from the “if” condition in the law text that states, “if the price of a journey is based on the measure-
ment of time and distance, then…”. We identified this ambiguity specifically through the struggle between 
the FTOF and the FTSA over the interpretation of this part of the law. In spring 2018, FTSA, who had been 
given authority by the MTC to specify in more detail what an “other device” is, provided different interpre-
tations about when a taximeter or other device is required: (1) “If the customer is told the maximum price 
of the ride beforehand, then a taximeter is not required” (March 2018); (2) “If the customer is told a bind-
ing price range beforehand, then a taximeter is not required” (April 2018); (3) “The approach of FTSA is 
to comply with the vehicle law and interpret that an optional other device or system apart from a taxi-
meter is possible. Certain options thus are the use of a taximeter that corresponds to the EU measurement 
directive, or the basing of the price on something else than measuring time and distance” (April 2018); (4) 
“If the measurement of the trip is based on time or distance, there has to be a taximeter that corresponds 
to the measurement directive in the car. If the customer is given a fixed price before the ride, then there 
does not need to be a taximeter or not necessarily any other device either.” (FTSA newsletter, May 2018). 
With “taximeter” the FTSA referred to a “certified taximeter”. Thus, the FTSA first put forward the idea that 
giving a maximum price or price-range corresponds to a fixed-priced ride.  
The FTOF challenged the FTSA’s initial interpretation of the law that would free the service provider from 
the requirement to use a certified taximeter or other device in case a maximum price or price range is given: 
“In our view it is completely clear that a taximeter or other device always has to be in a vehicle that is 
used for licensed passenger transport, when the price of the ride is based on measurement of time or 
distance. […] In our view, giving a binding price range beforehand does not free one from the taximeter 
requirement.”. According to the FTOF, when a maximum price or price range is given beforehand and the 
actual price is defined only at the end of the ride, it indicates that a measurement of time or distance takes 
place when determining the price, and this in turn requires the use of a certified taximeter or other device 
according to the new taximeter regulation. In May 2018, the FTOF filed a complaint with the Attorney Gen-
eral regarding the FTSA’s interpretation of the law, arguing that the FTSA had overstepped their authority 
when providing these interpretations. In September 2018 the Attorney General responded to the complaint 
that the FTSA had not overstepped their authority when making these interpretations. The Attorney Gen-
eral’s response was interpreted by the FTOF to mean that a certified taximeter is required when the price is 
determined based on a measurement of time and distance, and this interpretation was taken up by several 
other actors, as we will describe in connection to Ambiguity 2.  
Ambiguity 2: What is an “Other Device or System”?  
The second ambiguity arising from the ambiguous taximeter law concerns the question of what qualifies as 
an “other device”. FTSA was issued the authority to define in more detail what an “other device or system” 
would be, but FTSA did not provide any specifications for the other system or device. One reason for this is 
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that the current Finnish taximeter regulation was suspected to be in contradiction with the EU measure-
ment directive. If a country decides to apply the EU measurement directive for taximeters, then the country 
is not allowed to make any own specifications for devices that fulfill the same measurement task as the 
certified taximeter. The measurement task of the certified taximeter is to determine the price of a ride based 
on the measurement of time and/or distance. Thus, if the measurement task of the other device or system 
also is to determine the price based on the measurement of time and/or distance, it fulfills the same meas-
urement task as a certified taximeter, and thus it is not possible to give more detailed specifications. As one 
representative of the MTC expressed: “There is not really any official office who to ask about it. FTSA 
interprets the law in such a way that they cannot give any parallel specifications [for the other device or 
system] because the measurement directive in principle prevents it. So now we are in kind of a stalemate 
regarding this, as no one really has the authority to say what it means”.  
More specifically, the ambiguity concerns what it means for a device to have a “similar level of measurement 
accuracy and data protection standard” to what a certified taximeter has. As a result of the lacking specifi-
cation for what another device or system is, and what its measurement accuracy and data protection should 
be, there now are numerous different technologies-in-use as “taximeters” in the Finnish taxi service indus-
try. In the strictest interpretation, only a certified taximeter can be an “other device or system”. This is the 
interpretation that most official authorities took. For example, the FCCA said: “At the moment we have 
such a law that if the measurement of time and distance is the basis for pricing, then a taximeter that 
fulfills the measurement directive has to be used.” Similarly, one taxi organization expressed; “If it says 
taximeter or other device, then it means specifically a device as defined by FSCA and the EU measurement 
directive.” A taximeter producer said: “Well I was very happy with the [law] text, because other device 
means that one has to proof that is has been [certified] in the same way, so with a notified body. […]”  
On the other hand, several actors interpreted the law differently, for example ride sharing platform provid-
ers. Bolt, e.g., commented: “In my understanding, at least based on what also was expressed by the Min-
istry in some statement they had published, their goal, or the goal of the Act on Transport Services in 
general was to enable the market entry of those new payment types, new types of ride hailing. So, I am 
in the understanding that they specifically want to allow such mobile-based devices […]”.   
Most importantly, by bringing to the market and using different types of technologies and solutions for 
calculating/giving the price to the customer, these actors indirectly expressed that they interpret these tech-
nologies to be legal.  
To summarize, the new taximeter regulation with its ambiguities, and the interpretations put forward by 
different actors together with the technologies-in-use, gave rise to four questions (see Table 2). Regulative 
legitimacy of a certain technology-in-use is dependent on what the answer (yes or no) to one or more of 
these four questions would be. We refer to these questions and possible answers with their identifier (e.g., 
[Q1-Y]) in the next section. Next, we present the technologies-in-use and our analysis of whether and why 




Is the ride fixed-priced where the price is not dependent on the measurement of time and distance 
[Q1-Y] (thus neither requiring a certified taximeter nor another device) or not [Q1-N] (thus re-




Does a maximum price, price range or price estimate correspond to a fixed-priced ride (thus nei-
ther requiring a certified taximeter nor another device) [Q2-Y] or not (thus requiring a certified 




Does the new taximeter regulation even allow the use of any other technology apart from the cer-
tified taximeter to determine the price of a ride based on measurement of time and distance [Q3-




If other technology than the certified taximeter is allowed to be used to determine the price of a 
ride based on measurement of time and distance, does it possess a similar level of measurement 
accuracy and data protection standard [Q4-Y] or not [Q4-N]? (Q3 rises from Ambiguity 2) 
 
Table 2. Questions arising from the two types of ambiguity  
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Legal certainty and legal indeterminacy of technologies-in-use  
We identified seven different types of technologies that are currently used by providers of taxi services and 
ride-hailing services. For each technology type we identified whether and how the question of regulative 
legitimacy is problematic in the light of the possible answers to the four questions (see Table 2) that the 
ambiguous regulation gave rise to. 
Technology 1: Certified taximeter  
The certified taximeter – i.e., a taximeter that is fixed installed in the car and is type-certified according to 
the EU Measurement-directive 2014/32/EU – is still used widely in taxi cars, especially in cars that are 
being dispatched by one of the traditional Finnish dispatch organizations. There is no ambiguity related to 
this technology, and legal certainty in the light of the old and new regulation exists for Technology 1. 
Technology 2: Uncertified taximeter that is fixed installed in the car, but for which EU Meas-
urement-directive type-certification is in progress 
One Finnish producer of certified taximeters sold their new taximeter model which was still in the process 
of being type-certified starting from July 2018. Before the change of the law, a taximeter that had not yet 
been type-certified could not have been sold: “When the law changed so that the certification is not any 
more needed, we dared to offer it on the market sort of unfinished in the sense that we did not have to 
acquire the official certificate first.” (A taximeter producer) This model has been sold on the market for 
almost 1.5 years in an “uncertified” state. This technology comes closest to the certified taximeter and has 
been type-certified in December 2019. It has been used by several non-traditional dispatch organizations 
as well as individual drivers whose rides are not dispatched by a dispatch organization. 
It would be arguable that this technology had a similar (and most likely equal) level of measurement accu-
racy and data protection standard as a type-certified taximeter [Q4-Y], and it can attain regulative legiti-
macy in this perspective (but maybe only in hindsight). However, in the light of the possible interpretation 
that only a certified taximeter can be an “other device or system” [Q3-N], this technology could also be 
interpreted to face the situation of legal indeterminacy.  
Technology 3: Uncertified physical taximeter that is not fixed installed in the car 
This type of technology is used by some of the independent drivers that do not belong to any dispatch or-
ganizations and that mainly take on customers from taxi stands or when being hailed down on the street. 
Such taximeters can be ordered, e.g., from Alibaba and eBay for about $70.  
In the light of Ambiguity 2, this type of technology is problematic because there is no way to know whether 
they measure accurately the distance, and there is no standard of data protection that could be comparable 
to that required from a traditional taxi meter (e.g., indestructible memory) [Q4-N]. From the perspective 
of achieving regulative legitimacy, the fact that no clear regulatory specifications for the measurement ac-
curacy and data protection standard have been given by the government or other regulative authorities 
against which the technology can be evaluated makes it also more difficult to “disqualify” the technology 
from being legal. Thus Technology 3 faces the situation of legal indeterminacy. 
Technology 4: “Taximeter” app downloaded from some app-store 
Several independent taxi drivers whose rides are not dispatched from any dispatch organization use some 
taximeter app they downloaded from an app store. These apps are installed on the driver’s phone, and the 
price of the ride is calculated based on a measurement of time and distance (e.g., via a GPS signal). Many 
of these apps can be integrated with other software, such as, for example, apps for secure payments includ-
ing credit cards (e.g., Square Point of Sale) and PayPal. Some offer trip logs for drivers’ personal bookkeep-
ing and/or provide services where all trips are stored in the cloud. 
These apps are especially problematic from Ambiguity 2 perspective. As they are designed to define a price 
based on the time and distance measured, they are used as “other devices”. The problem in the light of the 
taximeter law is that it is unclear what the measurement accuracy of these devices is, and that they do not 
have a similar standard of data protection as a certified taximeter [Q4-N]. While the MTC argued that GPS 
measurement can be as accurate or even more accurate than measurement by a certified taximeter, a taxi-
meter producer argued that GPS had been found to not provide sufficiently accurate measurement of dis-
tance to be qualified for use in a certified taximeter. Thus, Technology 4 faces legal indeterminacy.  
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Technology 5: Internet-based ride dispatch platform where some price is given before the 
ride, but where the price can change 
This type of technology refers to ride-hailing apps where there may be a difference between the price infor-
mation given before the ride and the final price the customer actually pays. The price is not calculated by a 
certified taximeter. This type was represented in the Finnish market by platform providers such as Uber, 
Bolt and Yango. One of the goals of the new taximeter law was to enable providers of this type to compete 
in the Finnish taxi market.  
Uber entered the Finnish market in July 2018 and announced the price of their ride to the customer in form 
of a price-range until November 2019. Starting from November 11th, 2019, it announced the price in form 
of a price-estimate. However, the final price of the ride could be higher (or lower) than the given price range 
or price estimate, e.g., if the car got stuck in a traffic jam and the actual time required for the ride was much 
longer than initially estimated. The discussion undertaken in the context of Ambiguity 1 – when is a taxi-
meter or “other device” required – is relevant here. The discussion between, e.g., FTSA and FTOF revolved 
around the question whether a taximeter or “other device” is needed if a price range or maximum price is 
given to the customer beforehand. As an FTOF representative [representing the combination of Q2-N and 
Q3-N] said in one of our interviews: “So they do not give the price, they give a price-estimate, in which 
case they would have to have a [certified taximeter in the car, but they don’t, and no one is requiring them 
to [have one].” Uber itself has positioned itself as an “other device”. In one of their statements regarding an 
intended change of the taximeter law, Uber pointed out that their app “is not a taximeter”, but that it any-
way allows “an exact and accurate measurement of time and distance”. (Uber statement on law proposal) 
During its time of operation in the Finnish market between October 2018 and January 2020, Bolt provided 
its customers with a “fixed” price for the ride. However, as with Uber, the final price could actually be higher 
if the ride took longer than the estimation of time and distance that the beforehand given price was based 
on. Bolt, in one of the interviews we conducted with them, anyway stated that they are not a taximeter, but 
also not an “other device”, as they provide the customer with the price before the ride. Thus, they argued to 
be a service that offers a fixed-priced ride, and in this interpretation, Questions 3 and 4 would not apply.  
Yango – the localized brand name for the Russian Yandex.taxi – entered the Finnish market in November 
2018. On their website they stated that “Prices shown are estimates. Actual price depends on time and traffic 
conditions”. They present a pricing list that specifies how much each minute/km of the ride adds to the ride 
price. Thus, as the price shown is an estimate, and the actual price depends on a measurement of time, it 
can be seen to represent an “other system”.  
In the light of the prevailing taximeter law, regulative legitimacy can be argued to exist or not to exist – 
depending on how Questions 1-4 would be answered. Bolt can justify its regulative legitimacy by arguing it 
offers a “fixed priced ride” [Q1-Y], which would mean it would not require a similar level of measurement 
accuracy and data protection standard as a certified taximeter. However, this is contradicted by the fact that 
the final price might change based on the actual time and/or distance required for the ride [indicating Q1-
N]. Yango and Uber, on the other hand, use Ambiguity 2 to justify their regulative legitimacy, indicating 
they see themselves to represent “other devices”. However, they could be seen to be problematic in the light 
of the interpretation of the law that argues that only a certified taximeter is an allowed technology [Q3-N], 
but also when it comes to being able to “proof” that their measurement accuracy and standard of data pro-
tection is similar to a certified taximeter (Question 4), as – apart from the EU measurement directive - no 
specifications were provided by the FTSA against which this regulative legitimacy could be established. 
Thus, Technology 5 faces the situation of legal indeterminacy. 
Technology 6: Internet-based ride dispatch platform which gives a fixed price before the ride 
Several traditional and non-traditional dispatch organizations offer their customers the possibility to order 
fixed-priced rides via a ride-hailing app. In contrast to Technology 5, the price given before the ride is fixed 
and will not change if the starting point and end point of the journey does not change, and this is strongly 
emphasized when advertising these apps. For example, one organization states on their website: “By order-
ing the taxi with the app you always get a fixed price for your ride beforehand – whether there is a traffic 
jam along the way or not.” Another organization states: “The app offers the customer the possibility to 
order the ride with a beforehand ensured price upon ordering the ride. The fixed price differs for example 
depending on the time of day and date, so it takes already into consideration, for example, peak times and 
seasons. In this way the customer knows the price of the trip already before jumping into the taxi, and no 
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price surprises can arise.” Thus, this technology type “counters” the operation model of international plat-
form providers where the final price might be higher than the price estimate or range given by the app.  
What is especially interesting about this type of technology in the context of the prevailing taximeter law is 
that the question of whether such an app has a corresponding level of measurement accuracy and data 
protection standard, i.e., whether it qualifies as an “other device”, is irrelevant. As the price is fixed and not 
based on a real-time measurement of distance or time, this type of technology falls into the category of “not 
requiring any taximeter or other device” [Q1-Y]. Thus, legal certainty exists for this type of technology - 
it gains regulative legitimacy through the law text that is unambiguous regarding fixed-priced rides that are 
in no way dependent on measurement of time or distance.   
Technology 7: Ride-hailing app where price is determined with certified taximeter 
Several traditional taxi dispatch organizations provide their customers with the possibility to order a ride 
via an app, where the app gives a price estimate for the ride based on start and end address of the ride. The 
actual price, however, is then calculated with a certified taximeter. Thus, legal certainty exists for this 
type of technology as the measurement of time and distance happens via the certified taximeter.  
In summary, under the new regulation, legal certainty can only be argued to exist for Technology 1, 6 and 7 
can be argued to be legal, whereas Technology 2-5 face the situation of legal indeterminacy.  
Discussion 
In this study, we asked the question “How does the change from specific to ambiguous policy affect regula-
tive legitimacy of technology?” We have studied this by investigating the ambiguous policy simultaneously 
with the technologies-in-use. 
Empirical studies on policy are much needed in the IS community. The research community shares the 
social agreement that Information Systems research should be better attuned with policy concerns 
(Clemons and Wilson 2018; King and Kraemer 2019). With this study, we contribute to the IS institutions 
and legitimacy research stream in three ways. Our first contribution, in answer to our research question, is 
to demonstrate how the transition from specific to enabling regulation shifts the locus of regulative legiti-
macy from an inherent property of legal formulation to a more relational, performative and contested form. 
This puts forward the proposition that when a technology law is ambiguous, regulative legitimacy of tech-
nology takes the form of a process (see Suddaby et al. 2017). This results in a methodological implication 
that the study of regulative legitimacy in such settings, for example in neoliberal reforms, requires simulta-
neous attention to the ambiguities of the regulation vis-à-vis the emerging technologies-in-use. Second, our 
study contributes to research on adoption and use of (digital) technologies by providing a conceptualization 
of the connection between ICT policy and regulative legitimacy, both of which have been found to affect 
policy adoption and use in previous research. Third, we propose policy type (specific vs. ambiguous) and 
legal state of the technology as key dimensions when studying regulative legitimacy of technology in the 
context of ICT policy reforms.   
From Regulative Legitimacy as Inherent Property to Process 
Our study presented a transition from specific to ambiguous regulation. The study was conducted in the 
context of Finland’s 2018 Act on Transport Services (see also Lanamäki et al. 2019; Lanamäki et al. 
forthcoming; Väyrynen 2020). When technology is explicitly and specifically regulated by a policy and thus 
the law mandates what is allowed or required and what is prohibited and thus illegal, then such policy 
strongly determines the technologies-in-use. Legal certainty facilitates law-abiding: “people can know what 
the law is and can orient their conduct on what it requires” (Maxeiner 2006b, p. 525). 
Legitimacy literature includes different perspectives on what legitimacy is, one of them seeing legitimacy 
as a property that is “possessed in measurable quantity by some legitimacy object in relation to others” 
(Suddaby et al. 2017, p. 453). In the light of technology regulation, the legitimacy object usually is some 
technology or family of technologies, for example medical devices (Altenstetter 2003) or nuclear energy 
(Benz 2012). In our case, the technology was the certified taximeter and technologies to be used instead of 
or in combination with a certified taximeter. Based on our empirical data, we argue that from a regulative 
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legitimacy point of view, legitimacy is inherent in a specific, unambiguous policy. The policy offers a suffi-
cient foundation to assess the regulative legitimacy of any technology-in-use. In our empirical case study, 
the previous Finnish taximeter regulation was specific and determined clearly that only certified taximeters 
that were fixed-installed in the car were legal, and that no other technologies were allowed for determining 
the price of a taxi ride based on measurement of time, distance or any other criteria. Thus, only the certified 
taximeter possessed regulative legitimacy (see Kaganer et al. 2010), and legal certainty existed for all “tax-
imeter technologies” (i.e., all technologies except the certified taximeter were illegal). More generally, based 
on our empirical study, we argue that when a law provides legal certainty, technologies-in-use can possess 
regulative legitimacy as a property (see the left-hand box in Figure 1) – a technology either is legal, or it is 
not in the light of the valid regulation. The previous taximeter regulation did not allow actors to put forward 
different interpretations as to which technologies are legal or illegal.  
   
  
Figure 1. Regulative Legitimacy in the Context of Legal Certainty vs. Legal Indeterminacy  
 
However, when policy that regulates the technologies-in-use is ambiguous, and especially when means am-
biguity leaves open the exact ways and exact technologies allowed in the implementation of the policy (Mat-
land 1995, Ravishankar 2013), it is not anymore self-evident for each technology-in-use whether it holds 
regulative legitimacy. In our study, for some of the technologies-in-use legal indeterminacy (Kress 1989) 
resulted from the legal reform that turned a previously specific policy into an ambiguous policy. In the light 
of the two types of ambiguity in the regulation, and the possible answers to the four questions we identified, 
regulative legitimacy was not any more a property that each technology-in-use either possessed or not. In-
stead, it turned to an interactive process of social construction (Suddaby et al. 2017) where different actors 
put forth their own interpretation of why – in the light of the identified ambiguity and the questions the 
ambiguity gave rise to – a certain technology or characteristic of how the price is announced would be legal 
or not. Previous studies have addressed the struggles and contexts over different interpretations of policy 
(Bernardi et al. 2017; Dewulf 2013), such as we also have observed in our case study. However, the struggles 
in our case were enabled only by the ambiguity in the new regulation. The previous taximeter regulation 
was so specific and clear that it simply did not allow for any differences in interpretation. Thus, leaning on 
Suddaby et al.’s (2017) distinction between (regulative) legitimacy as property vs. process vs. perception, 
we argue that in the context of ambiguous policy, regulative legitimacy takes the form of a process (see the 
right-hand box in Figure 1) rather than that of a property. This does not necessarily mean that all technol-
ogies-in-use face the situation of legal indeterminacy, but that the policy ambiguity does not any more pro-
vide legal certainty for all technologies-in-use. One specifically interesting example of this in our case was 
when different actors justified in different ways how the same type of technology had regulative legitimacy 
by making use of different types of ambiguity in their argumentation. While Uber positioned itself as an 
“other device” that accurately measures time and distance, Bolt positioned itself to be “neither taximeter 
nor other device”, but instead a fixed-priced ride for which the technology does not have to fulfill any spe-
cific requirements regarding measurement accuracy or data protection standard. In our findings we demon-
strated several more examples of technologies-in-use that were subject to legal indeterminacy under the 
new, ambiguous taximeter regulation.  
In the study we presented here, different actors performed and contested regulative legitimacy of different 
technological solutions in the light of the new taximeter law, some opposing and others supporting the 
change that would allow the use of other devices than the certified taximeter. This is signifying for the ap-
proach of seeing legitimacy as a process (Suddaby et al. 2017). Suddaby and colleagues (2017) pointed out 
that many studies that take the process view of legitimacy – while providing valuable rich descriptions of 
the institutional context – remain short on the role that these contextual factors play. With the present 
research we contribute to this stream of research by addressing this shortcoming: we specifically focused 
on exploring the role of the contextual factor of ambiguous technology regulation. We illustrated how in a 
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policy reform that changed technology-regulating policy from being specific and unambiguous into being 
ambiguous, regulative legitimacy turned from being a property into taking the form of a process. 
Towards identifying Key Dimensions for Studying Regulative Legitimacy of Tech-
nology in a Policy Reform 
In this section, we build on the conceptual basis we developed in the theoretical background and on the 
findings from our empirical case study and conceptually extend these. We wish to provide a basis for future 
studies that are interested in exploring institutional, regulative legitimacy of technology (but possibly also 
for other legitimacy objects) in the context of legal reforms. We argue that the study of (regulative) legiti-
macy emerging from legal reforms requires attention to both the regulation (or policy) vis-à-vis the emerg-
ing technologies-in-use and their legal state. When studying regulative legitimacy, it is important to deter-
mine whether one looks at legitimacy in the light of specific regulation/policy or ambiguous regulation/pol-
icy. Figure 2 illustrates a 2x2 matrix with policy type (specific or ambiguous) and legal state of technology 
(legal certainty vs. legal indeterminacy) as its dimensions. Four different types based on the “combinations” 
of these dimensions are possible. We denote these types as A, B, C and D. Figure 2 gives an example of 
policy for each type. In a legal reform, the type might remain unchanged, but it also might change.  
 
Figure 2. Key Dimensions and Resulting Combinations When Studying Legitimacy of Tech-
nology in the Context of Policy Reform  
 
Our case study captured the transition from a specific policy with legal certainty for the technology-in-use 
(C in the Figure 2) to an ambiguous policy resulting in legal indeterminacy for many of the technologies-in-
use (B in Figure 2). When studying legitimacy emerging from legal reforms, it is beneficial to establish what 
type of reform one is looking at. Does the legal reform represent a change from specific to ambiguous policy 
(C->A, C->B, D->A, D->B), ambiguous to ambiguous policy (A->B, B->A), ambiguous to specific policy (A-
>C, A->D, B->C, B->D), or specific to specific policy (C->D, D->C)? And how does the policy change affect 
the legal state of technologies-in-use? Does the legal state of all technologies-in-use change, or just a subset 
of them? For some research, the answer to these questions might affect the choice of legitimacy lens. Our 
2x2 matrix can serve as a basis to systematically studying which differences arise between different types 
of policy changes regarding the regulative legitimacy of the technology-in-use. What are the mechanisms 
for gaining regulative legitimacy, for example, when moving from an ambiguous policy with legal certainty 
to a specific policy with legal certainty (A->C)? Some ride-sharing organizations such as Uber are known 
for “not waiting for the legitimacy that comes from changes in law” (Witt et al. 2015, p. 3). This may require 
changes to a specific policy that resulted in legal indeterminacy (e.g., because new innovations such as Uber 
were adopted on the market that do not fit into the existing policy frame) into a policy that results in legal 
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certainty (D->C or D->A). Another question to address in future research concerns where regulative legiti-
macy is foremost located in different combinations of policy type and legal situation of the technology. 
Our findings are also relevant for studies regarding the adoption and use of digital technologies. As we 
outlined in the introduction, both ICT policy (e.g., Eaton et al. 2018; Bernardi et al. 2017) and ICT legitimacy 
(e.g., Krell et al. 2016; Winter et al. 2009) affect implementation and adoption of IT. With our study, we 
provide a conceptualization of the connection between ICT policy and legitimacy by emphasizing the role 
of regulative legitimacy. Our study demonstrates the large impact that policy ambiguity has on the adoption 
of different technologies on the market, arguably leading to unintended consequences in form of unwanted 
or unanticipated technologies. Policy ambiguity can represent a “loophole” (e.g., McGoey and Jackson 
2009; Picciotto 2015) which can be used to adopt technology that was unintended by the policy makers on 
the market. We assume, for example, that the policy makers intended to allow Technology 3 and 4 to be 
used for determining the price of a taxi ride. For those interested in studying technology adoption and use 
in the context of ICT policy and regulative legitimacy, our study provides a strong foundation.  
Conclusion 
Against the backdrop of technology adoption and use being affected by ICT policy and ICT legitimacy, in 
the present study we explored how policy ambiguity affects regulative legitimacy of technology. With our 
empirical, qualitative case study on the change of the Finnish taximeter regulation that resulted in the adop-
tion of an abundance of different technologies on the Finnish taxi market, we theoretically contribute espe-
cially to the IS institutions and legitimacy research stream. We propose that under ambiguous technology 
law, legitimacy of policy is not any more an inherent property of the legal formulation, but instead takes the 
form of a process (see Suddaby et al. 2017). The methodological implication of this is that when studying 
legitimacy in such settings, e.g., neoliberal reforms, attention must be put simultaneously to the ambiguity 
of the regulation and the technologies that consequently emerge into use. In addition, we propose a 2x2 
matrix with the two dimensions of policy type (specific policy vs. ambiguous policy) and the legal state of 
technology (legal certainty vs. legal indeterminacy) that can be used to identify what type of legal change 
one is looking at and what the implications of the change may be. Our research also has practical impli-
cations. For policy makers, our study illustrates the possible unintended consequences of ambiguous pol-
icy making when legal reform is driven by the free market ethos. When making unspecific ICT related policy 
making to allow new innovations to be adopted, a thorough a-priori analysis of possible interpretations of 
the law might be advisable. As all research, also ours has limitations. Conducted in a very specific setting 
in one country, we recognize that the findings of our study might not be replicable in other contexts. Also, 
the present study neither focused on analyzing in detail the different factors that led to the ambiguity in the 
policy, nor why exactly those technologies that we identified as technologies-in-use were adopted on the 
market. In addition, we focused specifically on regulative legitimacy but did not consider other types of 
institutional legitimacy such as cognitive, pragmatic, and normative legitimacy (see Kaganer et al. 2010). 
These limitations also open directions for future research. In order to get a more nuanced understand-
ing of why certain technologies are adopted under ambiguous policy, it would be necessary to study also the 
processes that take place between the point in time when a policy is decided and when it is actually becom-
ing effective. When and how do these different technologies-in-use emerge? As outlined already in the dis-
cussion, future research could take our 2x2 matrix as basis for a systematic study of the differences that 
may arise between different types of policy changes regarding the regulative legitimacy of the technology-
in-use.  
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